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Abstract
One consequence of the two-earner deduction is to lower the marginal
tax rate on the first dollar earned by secondary workers and to encourage
their labor force participation. This study estimates the potential impact
of the two-earner deduction on the probability of labor foce participation
by married women and tests the sensitivity of labor force participation
levels to changes in the rate of deduction. Probit estimates of a labor
force probability model suggest that the two-earner deduction increases
the probability that a married woman work outside the home and that the
effect is stronger the higher the deduction rate and the greater the
after-tax income of the husband. Data for the study were drawn from the
1979 Michigan Survey of Income Dynamics.

WORK INCENTIVES AND THE TWO-EARNER DEDUCTION
Beginning in 1983, two- earner familes will be able to claim a
deduction equal to ten percent of the earnings of the lesser earning
spouse, up to a maximum deduction of $3,000. One consequence of the
deduction is to reduce the so-called marriage penalty on families with
two earners. Another consequence is to lower the marginal tax rate on
the first dollar earned by the lesser earning spouse, thus encouraging
work outside the home. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the
potential impact of the two-earner deduction on labor force participation
and to test the sensitivity of labor force participation to a change in
the rate of deduction.
The marriage penalty is the additional tax two-earner married couples
pay compared to what they would pay if they were single. It originates
in changes in the 1969 tax law which lowered the tax rate on single
persons so that the tax liability of the single taxpayer could not
exceed 120 percent of the liability of a married couple of similar
economic standing. Since married couples were not given the privilege
of filing as single persons if they so chose, married couples with two
earners often found their tax liabilities higher than they would have
been had it been possible for them to file as singles. This difference
in tax liability, known as the marriage penalty or marriage tax, reached
as high as $4,800 in the highest tax bracket in 1981.
As long as the budget set is convex, the decision whether or not
to enter the labor force depends on the net wage in the first tax bracket.'
If the net wage exceeds the reservation or shadow wage, it is ontimal for
a person to work outside the home; otherwise, the person will choose not
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to participate in the labor market. Hence, the reservation wage reflects
the monetary value of time in the home when all time is spent in the home.
The two-earner deduction, by raising the net wage in the first bracket,
encourages labor force participation by the lesser earning spouse.
In this study, we assume that the lesser earning spouse is always
the wife. Although not true in all families, this is generally the case.
Further, we assume that the wife is the secondary worker in the family.
She bases her labor force decision on her husband's labor market decision,
and while she is influenced by his decision, he is not influenced by
hers. This is a common assumption in labor supply research and allows
us to treat the earned income of the husband as an exogenous variable.
The first econometric study of the labor force participation of
married women was by Mincer (1962) . Using aggregate data on labor force
participation across SMSA's Mincer sought to explain women's labor force
participation through economic variables. His work called attention to
the family nature of labor supply decisions. One shortcoming of the
Mincer study was that he had to assume that the labor force participation
rate for a region could be considered a good estimate of the average
percentage of the life-cycle spent in the labor force by the married
women of that region.
More recent studies have avoided this assumption by the use of
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cross-section data over households and individuals. In these studies,
labor force participation becomes a dichotomous variable equal to one
if the individual is in the labor force and zero otherwise. Because
of the statistical difficulty of using regression analysis with a
dichotomous dependent variable, most of these studies have employed
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probit analysis which yields consistent and asymptotically efficient
parameter estimates in this case.
The present study employs the probit technique to estimate a
probability model of labor force participation for married women. Data
for the estimation are drawn from the Michigan Survey of Income Dynamics
for 1979 and include observations on 1,465 women. The estimated probability
model is used to calculate the probability of participation under the
current tax law and under alternative forms of the two-earner deduction.
The theoretical model is detailed in the next section.
I. Theoretical Expectations
The effect of an income tax on labor force participation can be
analyzed within the standard labor-leisure framework. In our model we
assume that satisfaction is derived from consumption of disposable
income and leisure, where the utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas
form:
U = 3 log Y
d
+ (1 - 3) log L
and where Y is disposable income, L is hours of leisure, and 3 is a
positive constant between zero and one. Disposable income or income
after tax is the difference between pretax income, Y, and the tax
liability, T(Y), where pretax income is the sum of earned income and
unearned income:
Y = w(K - L) + V
with w the hourly rate of pay, K the time endowment, and V unearned
income. Unearned income might consist of the property income of the
family and the wage income of other family members.
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Assuming a progressive income tax, the tax function:
T = T(w(K - L) + V)
has a positive first derivative, T', known as the marginal tax rate.
Substituting into the utility function and optimizing over leisure gives
the following first order condition for utility maximization:
_
sw_ ^ (i - 3) <
w(K - L) + V - T
with equality holding when there is an interior solution. Setting hours
of leisure equal to the time endowment (i.e., L=K) and solving for the
wage rate yields an expression for the reservation wage, w :
R
tt) wR
-
(1 - 6)(V
->
K
3K(1 - T')
where the hats over the tax variables indicate that they are evaluated
at L=K. Hence, T = T(V) and T' T f (V) are the tax and marginal tax
rate on unearned income or, alternatively, on the first dollar of wage
income assuming a smooth tax function.
A person will participate in the labor force if the market wage
is greater than or equal to the reservation wage and will not participate
otherwise. Thus,
LFP = 1 if w > w_
R
and
LFP =0 if w < w
R
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where LFP is a variable representing labor force participation. The
effect of taxes is felt through their impact of w ; a tax change that
R
increases w reduces the probability of labor force participation and
R
vice versa for a change that reduces w .
R
The effect of a tax change on the reservation wage and labor force
participation can be inferred by differentiating (1) with respect to
T' and T. This yields:
3W
R
:
,
(1 - g)(V - T)
3T f BK(1 - T')
which is positive, and
3wR (1 - 8)
3T 6K(1 - T')
which is negative. Since labor force participation is inversely related
to the reservation wage, our model suggests that an increase in T' reduces
the probability of labor force participation while an increase in T
increases the probability. An empirical test of this hypoethesis is
suggested in the next section.
II. Empirical Model and Results
The theoretical model of the previous section states that labor
force participation occurs if the market wage is greater than or equal
to the reservation wage. Since the market wage is unobserved for those
who do not work in the market and may be observed with error for those
who do, we specify the following market wage equation that is assumed
to hold for all women:
2
(2) w = aQ
+ a E + a
2
A + a X + a
4
X + aJZ + e
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where E is the education level of the individual, A is age, X is work
experience, C represents children, and e is a normally distributed
disturbance term with constanct variance, a
.
Using equation (1) and (2), the participation condition may be
rewritten as
a + a.E + a 9A + a„X + a,X
2
+ a<-C + e : (1 ~ 3)
(V
-
T)
1 L J 8K(1 - T')
and the probability of participating may be written as:
Prob(LEP) = Z(^ - a - B > (V: T) +X +X +X + X2 + %,
" SKod - T') " ° ° a °
where Z is the unit normal cumulative distribution function.
Probit analysis was used to estimate the parameters of this function
for a sample of married women. The sample for this study was drawn
from the Michigan Survey of Income Dynamics for 1979. A total of 1,465
white, married women were selected for inclusion in the sample. Excluded
from the sample were non-taxpaying households, households on welfare,
and households whose head was over 60 years or less than 18 years,
unemployed of receiving negative taxable income.
The dependent variable, labor force participation, was set equal to
one if the wife's annual hours of work were greater than 100 and equal
to zero otherwise. The unearned income of the family, V, was computed
by subtracting the wife's earned income from total family income. The
residual would then include the family's property income plus the earned
income of other family members. The tax parameters, T and T f , were
imputed on the basis of an estimated tax function. The family's total
income tax liability was regressed on total family taxable income, number
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of dependents, and whether or not the family owns a house. A similar
regression was run for the family's marginal tax rate. The coefficients
of these equations, shown in Table 1, were then used to calculate T and T'
for each family by setting the wife's earnings equal to zero and, hence,
taxable income equal to V.
The other explanatory variables included education, age, experience,
experience squared, and a children variable. Education of the wife was
measured in years as was age. Experience was measured as the number of
years the wife worked since age 18 and experience squared was the same
variable squared. The children variable reflected the number of children
in the age groups 1-2 years, 3-5 years, 6-13 years, and 14-17 years.
The results of the probit estimation appear in Table 2. The
coefficient of the tax variable, (V - T)/(l - T'), carries the expected
negative sign. This implies that an increase in the tax on unearned
income or a decrease in the marginal tax rate on unearned income will
increase the probability of labor force participation of married women,
confirming our earlier hypothesis. The implication of this finding for
tax policy is discussed in the next section.
But first consider some of the other results of the estimation.
The productivity variables, education and experience, both are related
in the expected way to the probability of labor force participation.
More educated women and those with more experience are seen to have a
higher probability of labor force participation although the effect of
experience decreases with increasing experience. The results also indicate
that, holding other factors constant, older married women are less likely
to participate in the labor force than are younger married women. This
could either be a productivity effect or a preference effect.
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Table 1 The Tax Functions (t-ratios in parentheses)
Variable
Constant
Taxable income
Number of Dependents
Home ownership
Income squared
Dependents x income
Home ownership x income
Federal Income
Tax Liability
-2594.6
(-9.912)
.315
(32.685)
-4 29.0
(-7.310)
-1281.3
(-6.114)
. 190x10
(8.077)
.010
(5.659)
.038
(4.525)
-6
Marginal Tax Rate
11.390
(20.666)
.873x10
(43.023)
-.656
(-5.311)
.912
(2.066)
-3
R .961 .890
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Table 2 Probit Estimation of the Labor Force Participation Function
for Married Women
Variable Coefficient t-ratio
Constant 1.265 4.29
(V - T)/(l - T 1 ) -.476xl0~
5
-3.72
Education .078 4.13
Age -.061 -11.82
Experience .143 8.41
Experience squared -.002 -3.80
Children 1-2 yrs. -.712 -8.68
Children 3-5 yrs. -.538 -7.08
Children 6-13 yrs. -.093 -2.09
Children 14-17 yrs. .040 0.58
Number of observations 1465
Minus two times log-likelihood ratio .359x10
Critical chi-squared (a = .05) 16.919
3
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The presence of young children in the home also lowers the probability
of labor force participation as is seen clearly in Table 2. This could
arise because children, especially those in the lower age groups, reduce
the mother's productivity in the market or because women who chose to have
children have a preference for non-market over market work. The results
of the probit estimation suggest that the influence of children on the
probability of labor force participation declines monotonically with the
ages of the children, with the mothers of teenage children being somewhat
more likely to work although the result is not significant.
The log-likelihood ratio presented at the bottom of the table
provides a test of the significance of the explanatory variables as a
group. Since minus two times the log-likelihood ratio is greater than
the critical Chi-squared, we can conclude that the set of explanatory
variables has predictive power in explaining the labor force participation
of married women.
Next we turn to the implications of the results for tax policy.
III. Tax Implications
In order to test the sensitivity of labor force participation to
a change in the rate of the two-earner deduction, the probability of
participation was calculated for each woman in the sample using the
results of the probit estimation. First, the probability of participating
under the current law was calculated. Its distribution by the husband's
after-tax income class is shown in the first column of Table 3. As can
be seen, the probability of labor force participation declines sharply
with increases in the husband's after-tax income. While the probability
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Table 3 The Probability of Labor Force Participation of Married Women
Under Alternative Two-Earner Deductions, by Income Class
Husband's after-
tax income
Under $10,000
$10,000 to $14,999
$15,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $24,999
$25,000 and above
All .537 .544 .550 .564
Current 10% De- 20% De- 50% De-
Law duction duction duction
.701 .702 .702 .705
.618 .620 .621 .627
.590 .594 .597 .606
.445 .451 .457 .473
.168 .201 .226 .281
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of participating in the labor force for a woman whose husband's income
is less than $10,000 is over .70, the corresponding participation
probability for a woman whose husband's income is over $25,000 is less
than .17. For women in this sample, the average probability of labor
force participation was calculated to be .54.
Next, the probability of labor force participation was calculated
assuming two-earner deductions of 10%, 20%, and 50%. The effect of the
two-earner deduction is to reduce the first-bracket tax rate facing
married women thereby increasing the probability of their labor force
participation. As shown in Table 3, the increases are greater the higher
the rate of the two-earner deduction. On the average, a 10% deduction
increases the probability of labor force participation by an estimated
1.3%, a 20% deduction increases it by an estimated 2.4%, while a 50%
deduction increases labor force participation by an estimated 5%.
While these increases are small on the average, the simulation
shows large expected increases in the probability of labor force
participation for women with high income husbands. For the $25,000 and
over group, Table 3 shows that a 10% deduction can be expected to
increase the probability of working outside the home by 19.6%, a 20%
deduction will increase it by 34.5%, and a 50% deduction will increase
it by 235.7%. This result is not unexpected since women with high
income husbands face the highest marginal tax rates and have the lowest
before-deduction probabilities of working. The two-earner deduction
gives them the largest incentive to participate in the labor force.
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IV. Conclusion
Our objective was to measure the impact of the two-earner deduction
on the labor force participation of married women. We found that the
two-earner deduction can be expected to increase the probability that
a married woman participate in the labor force, and that the effect is
stronger the higher the deduction rate and the the greater the after-
tax income of the husband. Our purpose in this section is to suggest
some directions for future research.
An underlying assumption of this study is that women are rational
in their perception of the taxes they pay and that they correctly perceive
the marginal tax rate they face. As a justification for our assumption,
we rely on the results of a study by Rosen (1976) showing that married
women perceive their taxes in the rational manner suggested by economic
theory. This assumption could be tested within our model following
Rosen's approach by introducing a perception coefficient into our model.
Another interesting extension of this study would be to recognize
the importance of work-related costs to the labor force participation
decision. As Hausman (1981) has shown, the fixed costs of working may
create nonconvexities in the budget set which interact with the effect
of taxes. The task of testing the significance of this effect is left
to future research.
Finally, in doing our analysis, we assumed that the labor force
behavior of the husband was exogenous to that of the wife. An interesting
extension of this analysis would be to relax this assumption and treat
the husband's and wife's labor force decisions within a simultaneous
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model. Likewise, the decision to have children is probably dependent
on one's labor force status as well as influencing the latter. This
gets us into life-cycle considerations beyond the scope of this research.
-15-
Footnotes
The marriage penalty is maximum for couples in the 50 percent
tax bracket whose incomes are equally divided between the spouses.
2
Hausman (1981) analyzes the implications of noneonvexities on
the participation decision.
3
See, for example, Leuthold (1978), Layard, Barton, and Zabalza
(1980), or Hausman (1980).
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